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1.  Introduction 
During the 1990s a large number of emerging and transition economies 
implemented profound market-oriented economic reforms.  State owned enterprises were 
privatized, fiscal imbalances were tackled, trade barriers were lowered, and in many 
countries capital controls were eliminated.  In the economic literature these economic 
policies are known, somewhat misleadingly, as the “Washington Consensus.”
1  
During the early stages of this process a number of authors became concerned 
with the “sequencing of reform.”
2  They argued that the order in which markets were 
deregulated mattered, and that liberalizing capital restrictions too early could be very 
costly.  Many of these analysts were worried about the effects of a premature opening of 
the capital account on the (real) exchange rate and on international competitiveness.  In 
particular, they pointed out that if restrictions on capital mobility were lifted “too soon,” 
the country in question would be flooded with short term capital.  This would result in an 
appreciation of the currency and reduce profitability in the exports’ sector; in some 
countries it could also generate a short term real estate boom.  The main danger, they 
argued, was that this increase in capital flows would be transitory, and that at some point 
foreign investors (and speculators) would withdraw from the country, generating a 
“sudden stop” and a costly crisis.          
As the 1990s unfolded a growing number of policy makers dismissed this 
apprehensions about sequencing.  Reforms were undertaken rapidly and almost 
simultaneously, and many countries relaxed capital controls during the early stages of the 
process.  For some time this strategy seemed to work, as many countries experienced an 
acceleration in growth.  In the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, however, growth 
was replaced by a succession of deep and traumatic crises.  In December 1994, the 
Mexican Peso collapsed and was devalued by more than 50%.  In 1997, when the 
emerging world was beginning to recover from Mexico’s “Tequila” crisis, the East Asian 
crises erupted, and it was followed by the Russian devaluation in 1998 and the failure of 
the investment firm Long Term Capital Management.  In 1999 Brazil’s real was 
devalued; in 2000 Turkey faced an external crisis; the Argentine peso collapsed in 2001, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Williamson (1990) and Rodrick (2006). 
2 See, Edwards (1990) and Funke (1993)   2
after 10 years of one-to-one parity with the U.S. dollar; and in 2002 Uruguay went 
through a deep balance of payments crisis.  In many of these countries – as well as in 
those affected by “contagion” -- output declined and unemployment increased 
significantly.   
During the early 2000s, and partially as a result of these crises, an increasing 
number of analysts began to criticize the Washington Consensus and the market oriented 
reforms.  Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz was, perhaps, the most forceful of the critics.  
In his 2002 book Globalization and its Discontent, Stiglitz argues that globalization 
policies and market reforms have the potential of doing a lot of good, if undertaken 
properly and if they incorporate the characteristics of each individual country.  The 
problem, according to Stiglitz, is that globalization was not pushed carefully or fairly.  
On the contrary, according to him, during the 1990s and early 2000s reform policies were 
implemented too fast, in the wrong sequence, and often using inadequate – or plainly 
wrong – economic analysis.  Three interrelated policy issues were at the center of 
Stiglitz’s and other criticisms of globalization and the Washington Consensus:  (1) in 
designing reform packages during the 1990s, crucial aspects of the sequencing and pace 
of reform were ignored.  As a result, in many countries reform was implemented too fast 
– Stiglitz prefers gradualism --, and in the wrong order.
3  (2) Advocating (and imposing) 
financial liberalization was a huge mistake.  According to Stiglitz freer capital mobility 
encourages speculation and increases the probability of external crises, including sudden 
stops of capital inflows.  And (3), the IMF involvement in the East Asian and 
Argentinean crises was a disaster that made things worse rather than better.
4  
In this paper I use a large cross country data set to investigate whether, as posited 
by some authors, an increase in the degree of financial openness affects the likelihood 
that a country experiences an external crisis.  In particular, I investigate if a liberalization 
process undertaken in the “wrong order” – that is, one characterized by an early 
relaxation of capital controls – increases a country’s vulnerability to a crisis.  More 
specifically, I use variance component probit analysis to analyze how different variables 
                                                 
3  Questions related to the sequencing of reform were first addressed by McKinnon (1973).  The subject 
was revived in the early 1980s by Edwards (1984).  Both of these authors argued that the most adequate 
sequencing implied postponing the opening of the financial account. 
4 Criticism of the Washington Consensus can also be found in Rodrik (2006).    3
affect the probability of countries being subject to sudden stops of capital inflows.  I also 
consider the role played by current account and fiscal imbalances, contagion, 
international reserves holdings, and the exchange rate regime on the probability of an 
external crisis.  Throughout the paper I define “crisis” as a major and abrupt decline in 
(net) capital inflows, or “sudden stop.” 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II I discuss some policy 
issues related to the sequencing of economic reform.  In Section III I develop an 
empirical model for analyzing the extent to which financial globalization and trade 
openness, among other variables, have affected the probability of an external crisis.  
More specifically, I investigate the way in which different combinations of trade and 
financial openness affect the estimated probability of a sudden stop of capital inflows.  In 
Section IV I provide some concluding remarks.  There is also a Data Appendix.  The 
paper differs from previous work on the subject -- including from some of my own 
previous efforts --, in several respects: first, I use a new measure of the degree of 
financial openness constructed from data collected by the Fraser Institute since 1975.  
Second, I use a data set that includes a larger number of countries and years than those 
used in previous works.  And third, and perhaps more important, I address questions 
related to the effects of alternative sequencings of economic reform on macroeconomic 
vulnerability. 
2.  Financial and Trade Liberalization in the 1990s and 2000s:  How Much? 
How Fast? In which Sequence? 
2.1  Trade and Financial Liberalization in the 1990s 
During the 1990s and early 2000s there was an unprecedented move towards trade 
and financial liberalization throughout the world.  Country after country reduced import 
tariffs and quantitative trade restrictions, and lifted controls on capital mobility.  Table 1 
presents data on average import tariffs – measured in percentage terms -- and an index of 
capital mobility for 6 regions for 1985-2004, computed by the Fraser Institute.  This 
capital mobility index goes from 1 to 10, with larger numbers denoting a greater degree 
of financial openness.  The data in this table are eloquent, and show that both trade and 
capital controls have declined significantly in every region in the world.  Average import 
tariffs declined by 49% between 1985 and 2004.  Tariff rates were reduced by 68% in the   4
advanced countries, 56% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 64% in Asia, 33% in 
Africa, and only 4% in the Middle East.
5  The final three columns in this Table also 
confirm that the degree of financial openness was much higher in 2004 than in 1985.  The 
pattern of financial liberalization, however, has differed across regions.  In Africa, the 
Middle East and Eastern Europe financial liberalization proceeded through 2004.  In the 
Industrial nations, Latin America and Asia financial openness “peaked” in 1995; between 
1995 and 2004 the index of financial openness declined slightly, indicating a small 
readjustment of regulations on cross boarder capital movements.  
Ideally, one would want to have detailed data for a large number of countries and 
years that would distinguish between controls on capital outflows and capital inflows.  
This would allow researchers to deal with more granular and textured issues, including 
issues that are germane to efforts to reduce capital inflows’ pressure on real exchange 
rates.  Unfortunately, these types of data are not readily available for a large number of 
countries and/or years.  The IMF only stated distinguishing between controls on inflows 
and outflows in 1996, and researchers that have attempted to go back in time and 
construct more detailed indexes have concentrated on a small number of nations.  
Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) pioneered the attempt to build disaggregated data on 
restrictions on inflows and outflows.  Their analysis, however, dealt with one year only 
(1996) and 45 countries.  Other efforts to calculate the extent of restrictions on inflows 
include Edison and Warnock (2003).  Their index refers to the stock market only, and is 
constructed as the ratios of market capitalization of “investible” securities to total market 
capitalization.  For an exhaustive discussion on measurement issues, including on the 
difficulties of providing separate long time series for inflows and outflows and a large 
number of countries, see Miniane (2004); see also the discussion and computations in 
Chinn and Ito (2006).  As with most measures of capital mobility, the Fraser Institute 
Index used in this paper and summarized in Table 1, does not make a distinction between 
controls on inflows and outflows.  As argued above, constructing such an index for a 
                                                 
5  Ideally one would also want information on non-tariff restrictions.  These data, however, are difficult to 
find for a large number of countries and years.  The Fraser Institute, for instance, has only data for some 
years since 1995; these shorter time series support the idea of a massive increase in the degree of trade 
openness.   5
large number of countries and a long period of time, continues to be a challenge for 
future research.  
2.2  The Sequencing of Liberalization 
  For a long time economists have argued about the appropriate sequencing and 
speed of economic reform.  During most of the 1980s – that is, before the massive push 
towards reform -- the generally agreed view on sequencing was: (1) Trade liberalization 
should be gradual and buttressed with substantial foreign aid.  (2) An effort should be 
made to minimize the unemployment consequences of reform.  (3) In countries with very 
high inflation, fiscal imbalances should be dealt with very early on in the reform process. 
(4) Financial reform requires the creation of modern supervisory and regulatory agencies. 
And (5), the capital account should be liberalized at the very end of the process, and only 
once the economy has been able to expand successfully its export sector.
6   
  In the early 1990s the issue of speed and sequencing became central in analyses 
on how to design a reform strategy for the former communist countries. In discussing the 
problems faced by Czechoslovakia during the early period of its transition, Vaclav Klaus 
pointed out that one of the main problems was deciding on “sequencing as regards 
domestic institutional and price measures on the one hand, and liberalization of foreign 
trade and rate of exchange on the other” (Klaus, 1990, page 18).  
  Interestingly, this emphasis on speed and sequencing has a long history in policy 
discussions. In fact, since the beginning of the economics profession, it has been dealt 
with over and over again.  Adam Smith, for example, argued in The Wealth of Nations 
that determining the appropriate sequencing was a difficult issue that involved, primarily, 
political considerations.  Moreover, Smith supported gradualism, on the grounds that 
cold-turkey liberalization would result in a significant increase in unemployment.  
Consider the following quote from The Wealth of Nations:  “[t]o open the colony trade 
all at once..., might not only occasion some transitory inconvenience, but a great 
permanent loss...[T]he sudden loss of employment..., might alone be felt very sensibly” 
(Vol. II, Ch. VII, pt. III, page 120).   
  Sometime during the early 1990’s the received wisdom on sequencing and speed 
began to be challenged by the IMF and U.S. Treasury.  Increasingly they called for an 
                                                 
6 See Edwards (1984) for an early discussion on these issues.   6
early and rapid opening of the financial account.  A number of authors and policy makers 
-- including Vaclav Klaus -- argued that politically this was the only way to move 
forward.  Otherwise, the argument went, reform opponents would successfully block 
liberalization efforts.  In 1995, IMF official Manuel Guitián said, “There does not seem to 
be an a priori reason why the two accounts [current and capital] could not be opened up 
simultaneously…[A] strong case can be made in support of rapid and decisive 
liberalization in capital transactions (Guitián, 1995 p. 85-86).” 
In the mid 1990s the U.S. government began pressuring the East Asian nations to 
liberalize their financial account restrictions and to allow capital to move more freely.  
Policy makers and academics in most of the Asia became extremely concerned about 
these recommendations.  They raised two main issues: On the one hand, they argued that 
– as had been the case in a number of Latin American countries during the early 1980s – 
liberalizing the financial account would result in massive real exchange rate appreciation.  
This was against the decades-old policy of maintaining a highly competitive real 
exchange rate as a way of encouraging exports.  The second concern was based on a 
vulnerability argument: an open financial account could make the East Asian nations 
more vulnerable to abrupt declines in capital inflows.  If this were to happen, the region 
would incur in severe adjustment costs and high unemployment, and could even end up 
with a smaller export sector.
7   
  The sequencing of reform discussion may be illustrated with the assistance of 
Table 2, where there are four combinations of financial and trade integration with the rest 
of the world.  The conventional “trade liberalization first” sequencing is given by a 
(gradual) move from Box 1, to Box 2, and eventually to Box 3: 
 
The “early financial integration” sequence, which has been criticized by Stiglitz and 
others, has two variants.  The “financial liberalization” first mode: 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Park and Park (1995). 
1  2  3   7
 
The second variant corresponds to a faster and simultaneous trade and financial opening: 
 
  Notice that Box 4 in Table 2 – a box characterized by a low degree of openness to 
trade in goods and a high degree of financial openness – characterizes the main features 
of the “capital account first” liberalization process.  Another way of putting it is that 
countries that followed the “conventional wisdom” sequencing of opening trade in goods 
first and delaying financial openness, will never find themselves in Box 4. 
During the last two decades the following countries have had, during one point or 
another, a relatively closed trade account (average tariffs in excess of 25%) and a 
relatively open financial account (Fraser index of capital mobility higher than 6):  Costa 
Rica, Egypt, Guatemala, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritius, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, 
Slovak Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
8  When alternative measures of financial 
integration are used – such as an index based on the sum of external assets and liabilities 
--, a similar list of countries with a relatively high level of tariffs and high degree of 
financial openness is obtained.  As pointed out, in terms of the typology in Table 2, these 
countries are in Box 4, a box that belongs to the criticized “early financial reform” 
sequencing.   
  Many of the Latin American countries that suffered major external crises during 
the 1990s and 2000s – including Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay – had opened their 
financial accounts early and rapidly.  This contrasted with the case of Chile and 
Colombia, two countries that maintained some controls on capital flows – and in 
                                                 
8 In order to be in this list a country has to have had, at least for one year, trade and financial indicators in 
excess of the thresholds presented above.  
1  3 
1  4  3   8
particular on capital inflows -- and did not default on their debts during the 1980s.
9  An 
interesting question, and one that I address in Section III of this paper, is whether 
countries whose policies are characterized by Box 4 in Table 2 have faced a higher 
probability of experiencing a sudden stop of capital inflows than countries with other 
configurations of capital and financial openness. 
3.  Globalization, Sequencing and Crises:  An Empirical Investigation 
    In this Section I investigate whether the degree of globalization affects the 
probability of a country experiencing a sudden stop of capital inflows.  I am particularly 
interested in analyzing the way in which alternative combinations of financial and trade 
openness affect the likelihood of a sudden-stops crisis.  This analysis will shed some light 
on the sequencing of reform debate, as well as on the validity of some of the criticisms of 
the so-called Washington Consensus.  I am also interested in investigating the way in 
which capital mobility affects the role played by other variables – including external 
imbalances and the degree of flexibility of the nominal exchange rate – in determining 
the probability of a sudden stop.  
3.1  The Empirical Model 
  The point of departure is a variance component probit model given by equations 
(1) and (2):    
  
 
1,    if   , 0
* > tj y  
(1)   tj y         =       





tj y    =     tj tj ε αω + . 
 
                                                 
9 On the Latin American reforms and crises see Edwards (2007b).  Some countries introduced controls on 
capital inflows in the 2000s, including Thailand and Brazil.   9
Variable  tj y  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country j in period t 
experienced a sudden stop crisis (as defined below), and zero if the country in question 
did not experience a sudden stop.  According to equation (1), whether the country 
experiences a sudden stop is the result of an unobserved latent variable
*
tj y , assumed to 
depend linearly on vector tj ω , which includes a number of economic, structural and policy 
characteristics of each economy, such as the degree of openness, external and domestic 
imbalances and others.  The error term  tj ε is given by a variance component model:  
. tj j tj μ ν ε + =    j ν is iid with zero mean and variance
2
ν σ ;  tj μ is normally distributed with 
zero mean and variance  1
2 = μ σ .  In addition to the random effects model, I also estimated 
fixed effects and basic probit versions of the probit model in equations (1) and (2).
10   
3.2  Specification and Variable Definition  
    I define a “sudden stop” episode as an abrupt and major reduction in net capital 
inflows to a country that, up to that time, had been receiving large volumes of foreign 
capital.  More specifically, I imposed the following requirements for an episode to 
qualify as a “sudden stop” crisis:  (1) the country must have received an inflow of capital 
(relative to GDP) larger than its region’s third quartile during the two years prior to the 
“sudden stop.”  That is, prior to the sudden stop incident the country in question must 
have been a high recipient of foreign capital.  And (2), net capital inflows must have 
declined by at least 3% of GDP in one year.  Table 3 contains data on the incidence of 
sudden stops for the period 1970-2004 for six regions as well as for the world as a whole.  
In the econometric analysis I use a one year window, where data for the year following a 
sudden stop episode are set as “missing.”  The main purpose of this window is to avoid 
double counting sudden stop episodes that are stretched over multiple years.  However, 
when the analysis was performed on the raw data, without a window, the results were 
similar to those reported here (See Section 3.6 for details). 
                                                 
10  In the “basic probit” estimation, the error term is assumed to have the standard characteristics.     10
In specifying the model I follow the literature on external crises, devaluations, 
sudden stops, and current account reversals.
11 In the base-case specification I included the 
following covariates, all of which are available for a large number of countries and years:  
•  The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP, lagged one period.  This 
allows me to investigate whether the “current account matters” when it comes 
to crises. 
•  The lagged ratio of the country’s fiscal deficit relative to GDP.   
•  The lagged value of an index that measures “contagion.”  This index is 
defined as the relative occurrence of a contraction in capital flows in each 
country’s “reference group.” The reference group, in turn, is defined for most 
countries as their region.  As in Table 3 there are five geographical regions:  
Latin America, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, Africa and Eastern 
and Central Europe.  The advanced countries belong to a group of their own.  
In this calculation data for the country in question are excluded.  The 
coefficient of this “contagion” variable in the probit equation is expected to be 
positive, reflecting the fact that when a similar country experiences a capital 
flow contraction, capital flows to the country in question will tend to decline, 
increasing the likelihood of a sudden stop.  
•  Percentage change in the terms of trade (defined as the ratio of export prices 
to import prices), with a one year lag.  Improved terms of trade are expected 
to lower the probability of a crisis; its coefficient should be negative. 
•  Lagged international real interest rates, proxied by real U.S. 10 year 
Treasuries.  As Eichengreen (2001) has argued, a decline in world liquidity – 
captured by higher international real interest rates – will tend to increase the 
probability of an external crisis.  If this is indeed the case, the coefficient of 
this variable will be positive.      
•  A dummy variable for each region.  In some of the regressions, instead of the 
regional dummies I included dummy variables for advanced countries.   
                                                 
11  See, for example, Calvo et al (2004), Glick and Hutchison (2005), Edwards (2002, 2004a, 2004b), 
Frankel and Cavallo (2004), Eichengreen et al (2006), Frankel and Rose (1996), and Milesi-Ferreti and 
Razin (2000).   11
•  A dummy variable that takes the value of one if that particular country has a 
de facto flexible exchange rate regime, and zero otherwise.  The classification 
of exchange rate regimes is taken from the updated data set developed by 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
•  International reserves as a proportion of the country’s total external liabilities.  
This indicator was constructed from data provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2006).  To the extent that a high level of international reserves held by the 
central bank is seen as an insurance policy, the coefficient of this variable is 
expected to be negative in the estimation of the probit equations. 
 
As a way of capturing alternative openness scenarios, I included the following 
variables into the probit analysis:
12 
 
•  A variable that measures whether the financial account is open.  This variable, 
which I call Cap_Open, takes the value of one if in any given year a financial 
openness index constructed on the bases of the Fraser Institute indicator takes 
a value equal or higher than 6, in a scale from 1 to 10.  This value of 6 
corresponds to the 25
th percentile of the financial openness index. 
•  A variable that measures whether the trade account is open in any given year.  
This variable, which I call Trade_Open, takes the value of one if the average 
tariff in that year and country is equal or lower than 10%.   This value 
corresponds to the 25
th percentile of the average tariff calculated by the Fraser 
Institute for 1985-2004; that is, only 25% of the country-year observations 
have values lower than 10% (See the data appendix).  Notice that a country 
may have “closed” trade – that is, import tariffs in excess of 10% -- and still 
develop (very) large current account deficits.   
 
                                                 
12 I am not aware of any study that has attempted to deal with sequencing issues with a methodology 
similar to the one used in this paper.   12
In Sub-Section 3.6, on extensions, I report and discuss results obtained when 
additional covariates, including the degree of dollarization of the economy and liabilities 
mismatches in the banking sector, are included in the analysis.  
3.3 Basic  Results 
The basic results from the probit estimates are presented in Tables 4, where as 
customary, I report the marginal effects of each independent variable on the probability 
of a sudden stop, evaluated at the mean values of the covariates.  For presentation 
purposes in this Table I don’t present the marginal effects of the regional dummies; none 
of them, however, was significant, indicating that once economics variables are taken 
into account, regional or geographical considerations don’t play an important role.  At the 
bottom of each column I also present the estimated probability of a sudden stop, also 
evaluated at the mean values of the covariates.  This is an important variable, which will 
become the center of much of the analysis that follows.  
As may be seen, most estimated coefficients have the expected signs and the 
majority of them are significant at conventional levels.  The following aspects of the 
results are worth discussing:  (a) countries with large (lagged) current account deficits 
face a higher probability of a crisis.  The point estimate of the marginal effect of the 
(lagged) current account deficit is rather small, however-- about one half of one percent.  
(b)  There is evidence of contagion.  A higher incidence of capital flows contractions in 
the region increases the probability of a sudden stop.  (c) Higher world interest rates – 
that is lower global liquidity – increases the probability of a crisis.  (d)  With other things 
given, having a flexible exchange rate reduces the probability of a financial crunch.  
Moreover, the marginal effect of the flexible exchange rate regime is rather large, at 
approximately (minus) 2 percentage points.  (e) The estimation reported in column (4.1) 
in Table 4 suggests that after controlling for the current account deficit, the public sector 
deficit plays no role in determining the likelihood of a crisis.  However, as may be seen in 
column (4.2), once the current account variable is excluded, the public sector deficits 
have a positive effect on the probability.  That is, a marginal increase in the government 
deficit that is not reflected in an external (current account) imbalance has no effect on the 
probability of a crisis.  (f) Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, with other things given,   13
neither changes in the terms of trade nor the stock of international reserves appear to 
affect the likelihood of a sudden stop.   
From this paper’s perspective the most important results are related to the 
coefficients of the two openness variables.   As may be seen, the coefficient of the 
financial openness dummy is significantly positive in the three regressions; moreover, the 
point estimates of the marginal effects are rather large, suggesting that with other 
variables given (and at their mean values), moving from a “closed” to an “open” financial 
account increases the probability of a sudden stop by approximately 4 percentage points.  
The results in Table 4 also show that the coefficient of the trade openness variable is 
always positive; the values of the z-statistics, however, are low. Only in one of the three 
regressions they exceed one, and in none of them they are significant at the 10% level.  
Aizenman and Noy (2004) have argued that financial and trade openness are highly 
correlated across countries and time.  This correlation may explain the low degree of 
significance of the trade openness variable.   
The results reported at the bottom of Table 4 show that, when all the covariates 
are at their mean values, the estimated probabilities of a sudden stop are on the low side, 
ranging from 3.2% to 4.2%.  In the Sub-Sections that follow I investigate how these 
estimated probabilities – and the marginal effects – change when the probability 
functions are evaluated at alternative values of the covariates and, in particular, when 
they are evaluated for different configurations of trade and financial openness. 
3.4  Probabilities of Sudden Stops under Alternative Configurations of Trade and 
Financial Openness: A Preliminary Exercise on the Sequencing issue 
    An important property of probit models is that marginal effects and estimated 
probabilities are conditional on the values of all covariates.  This means that if the value 
of one of the independent variables changes, the overall estimated probability– and of, 
the estimated marginal effect of all covariates for that matter -- will also change.  
Denoting the (normal) cumulative probability distribution by Φ, the probit model is 
defined by:  
 
(3)   ) ( ) | 0 Pr( jt jt jt y αω ω Φ = ≠   
   14
The marginal effect of covariate 1 z is calculated as the slope of the probability function, 
evaluated at a specific set of values of the covariates s jt ω .  If the estimated probit 
coefficient of  1 z is  1 α , and we want to evaluate the marginal effect of  1 z  at a point where 
covariates have values captured by vector ω ~, the marginal effect of  1 z  (evaluated at ω ~) 
is given by: 
 
(4)   . ) ~ ( ' 1
1





    
    In order to provide some insights into the sequencing issue, I use the estimates 
from column (4.3) in Table 4 to compute the probabilities of experiencing a sudden stop 
for the four configurations of financial and trade openness that appear in Table 2 (in 
performing this exercise the values of the other covariates have been maintained at their 
means).
13  That is, in terms of equation (3) above, I consider four alternative vectors ω ~ in 
the computation of the overall estimated probabilities presented in Table 5.  Each of these 
four vectors corresponds to a different combination of trade openness and financial 
openness.  For example, the estimates for the “Closed Trade Account - Close Financial 
Account” box (with a calculated probability of a sudden stop of 0.022) was estimated by 
evaluating equation (3) when the Cap_Open variable takes a value of zero, and the 
Trade_Open variable also takes a value of zero; in this calculation all other covariates 
take their mean value.  Likewise, the estimated probability “Closed Trade Account - 
Open Financial Account” box (0.068) was obtained by evaluating equation (3) when the 
Cap_Open variable takes a value of one, and the Trade_Open variable also takes a value 
of zero. 
    The results obtained for the estimated overall probabilities of a sudden stop crisis 
are presented in Table 5, where robust standard errors were used to compute the z-
statistics.  A first reaction to these computations is that in all four possible combinations 
of trade and financial openness the estimated probabilities are on the low side.  Even in 
the highest case the estimated probability is lower than 0.10.  Second, and as expected 
                                                 
13  The reason for choosing equation (4.3) for this exercise is that it provides the tightest estimate of the 
effect of trade openness on the probability of a sudden stop.   15
from the estimates reported above, these results show that the highest probability of 
facing a sudden stop is obtained when both the trade and financial accounts are open.  
This result, however, has to be interpreted with caution, for at least two reasons:  First, 
the coefficients of the trade openness indicator in the probit equations were estimated in a 
rather imprecise way (the z-statistic for the trade openness variable in column (4.3).  
Second, the probability estimates in Table 5 were obtained by evaluating the probability 
function at the mean values of all other covariates.  This, however, is a somewhat 
artificial exercise, as it is highly unlikely that countries that have very different 
configurations of trade and financial openness –and/or follow different sequences of 
reform --, will face the same values of other covariates.  Indeed, the concern about the 
“financial liberalization first” sequence is that it will result in a very large and 
unsustainable current account deficit; moreover, it has been argued that this sequence is 
particularly risky in the presence of pegged exchange rates.  In the Sub-Section that 
follows I address this issue by evaluating the sudden stop probability function under two 
alternative scenarios that include different current account deficits and exchange rate 
regimes.     
3.5  The Role of Current Account Imbalances and the Exchange Rate Regime in the 
Sequencing Debate 
Authors that favor a gradual liberalization course, where the financial account is 
opened towards the end of the process, and only after trade liberalization has been 
consolidated, have argued that that particular sequence avoids very large current account 
deficits.
14  Moreover, and as pointed out above, critics of early financial liberalization 
have been particularly concerned about the rigidities imposed by fixed exchange rates.  
Indeed, many of the major crises of the 1990s and 2000s – including the Mexican crisis 
of 1994, the East Asian crises of 1997-98, the 1998 Russian crisis and the 2001 Argentine 
currency collapse -- took place in countries that had built very large current account 
deficits – in the order of 6% to 8% of GDP – and had pegged or rigid exchange rates.  In 
order to analyze the roles played by both of these variables, in this Section I report results 
for estimated probabilities of sudden stops under two alternative scenarios in terms of the 
configuration of trade and financial openness, current account balances, and exchange 
                                                 
14  Stiglitz (2002).   16
rate regime. (For the actual methodology used, remember the discussion on equations (3) 
and (4), and the explanation on how the results in Table 5 were obtained).  The two cases 
under consideration are: 
 
•  Scenario A:  A country with a fixed exchange rate regime moves from a 
“closed-closed” situation to an “open financial-closed trade” 
configuration; that is, it moves from Box 1 to Box 4 in Table 2.  In 
addition, I assume that in the process of opening up financially the country 
develops a large current account deficit (8% of GDP).   In that regard, in 
this scenario the estimated probability of a crisis is computed by 
evaluating the probit function when the flexible exchange rate dummy 
takes a value of zero, and the current account variable takes a value of 
0.08.  This scenario, then, reflects a “financial liberalization first” 
sequencing that is accompanied by the development of a large current 
account imbalance, under fixed exchange rates.  
•  Scenario B:  Gradual transition from a “closed-closed” configuration to an 
“open-open” one.  I further assume that during the liberalization process 
the country adopts a flexible exchange rate regime and that, due to the 
gradualism of the process, it is able to maintain the current account deficit 
at “reasonable” levels (3.5% of GDP).  This means that in this scenario the 
estimated probability of a crisis is estimated by evaluating the probability 
function in equation (3) when the flexible exchange rate dummy takes a 
value of one, and the current account variable takes a value of 0.035.  In 




I use the estimates from column (4.3) in Table 4 for evaluating the probabilities under 
these two scenarios.  Under both Scenarios A and B the initial conditions are 
characterized by closed trade and financial accounts.  As may be seen from Table 5, in 
                                                 
15  The “gradualism” aspect of this scenario is built into the assumption that the current account deficit 
doesn’t explode, and remains within sustainable levels.  This is indeed a feature of gradual liberalizations 
(see Edwards, 2002).   17
this case the estimated probability of a sudden stop crisis is 0.022.  The estimated 
probabilities of experiencing a sudden stop crisis under the two alternative sequencing 
Scenarios described above are: 
 
•  Scenario A (abrupt “financial account first” strategy):  Estimated 
probability of experiencing a sudden stop: 0.133. 
•  Scenario B (gradual “financial account last” strategy):  Estimated 
probability of a sudden stop: 0.062. 
 
As may be seen, under both scenarios the overall estimated probability of a 
sudden stop increases relative to the “closed-closed” initial condition.  However, it 
increases significantly more (from 0.022 to 0.133) under Scenario A than under Scenario 
B (from 0.022 to 0.062).  These results suggest, quite strongly, that both the exchange 
rate regime and the evolution of the current account deficit are key variables for 
determining the likelihood of a capital inflows crunch.  In particular, maintaining the 
current account deficit within limits during a reform process reduces a country’s 
vulnerability very significantly.  Likewise, adopting a flexible rates regime reduces the 
risks of a crisis in an important way. 
Another important result is that according to this exercise, under Scenario A the 
country in question is more vulnerable to external shocks than under Scenario B.
16  For 
example, the marginal effect of world real interest rates shocks is twice as large under 
Scenario A as under Scenario B: 0.014 vs 0.007.  Notice, however, that under both 
scenarios these probabilities are still low in absolute terms.  
3.6  Extensions, Robustness,  Instrumental Variables, and Future Work 
In this section I investigate the robustness of the results and I discuss directions 
for future research.  I also present results obtained using instrumental variables probit 
estimates.  In dealing with robustness I focus on the definition of both the sudden stop 
indicator and of the openness indexes. 
                                                 
16 The marginal effects under these alternative Scenarios are not reported fully due to space considerations.  
However, they are available from the author on request.   18
Extensions and Robustness:  The results reported above were obtained when the 
sudden stops indicator was defined using a one year window.  This means that the 
observation corresponding to the year immediately following a sudden stop episode was 
set as missing.  However, one could alternatively define the episodes without using a 
window.  The results obtained when this is done are presented in column 1 of Table 6, 
where as before I report the marginal effects (as in previous Tables, and due to space 
considerations, I don’t show those for the regional dummies; once more, however, none 
of them was significant).  As may be seen, the estimated marginal effects are not very 
different from those discussed above and presented in Table 4; moreover, the overall 
message from the previous results is maintained.    
An important question is whether the results discussed here are driven by the way 
in which the two openness indicators were defined.  In order to investigate this possibility 
I estimated the variance component probit model using two alternative set of indicators 
for openness:  (a) I excluded (that is, I set to “missing”) observations where either the 
Fraser Institute financial openness index or average tariff variable took intermediate 
values.  That is, in constructing this alternative index I set the capital open indicator equal 
to one if the index is greater than 6 and zero if its value is smaller than 3; all observations 
with an index value in between these two values were set to “missing.”  Likewise, for the 
trade openness index, I set to “missing” all observations with import tariffs in between 11 
and 20 percent.  The results obtained when these alternative indexes of openness were 
used are reported in column 2 of Table 6.  (b)  As additional measures of integration to 
the world economy I used continuous indexes of financial openness and tariff averages 
computed on the bases of the Fraser Institute data (remember that the indexes used in the 
regressions discussed above where 0-1).  I called theses variable Tariff and Financial Op; 
a higher value of Tariff indicates a lower degree of trade openness, while a higher value 
of Financial Op captures a higher degree of financial openness.  These results tend to 
support those reported above.  The coefficient of trade openness is negative, but not 
significant at conventional levels; that of financial openness is significantly positive.  It is 
important to notice, however, that in this case the marginal effect – computed at mean 
values of all covariates – is very small: a unitary increase in the financial openness index 
raises the probability of a sudden stop by less than one tenth of one percent.   19
In order to explore further the role of trade openness, I replaced the tariffs-based 
indicator with the more traditional “exports plus imports, over GDP” ratio.  The results 
obtained are in column 4, Table 6.  As may be seen, these results strengthened our 
previous findings.  Notice that the overall predicted probability continues to be very low.   
Some authors have argued that the extent of dollarization of an economy – 
including mismatches between dollar denominated assets and liabilities in the banking 
and corporate sectors --, play an important role in determining its vulnerability to crises.
17  
In order to investigate this issue I added two dollarization-related variables to the 
estimation (a shortcoming of this exercise, however, is that the dollarization data are 
available for a relatively smaller set of countries): (a) the ratio dollarized deposits to total 
deposits in the banking sector.  This variable is called Dollar_Deposits, and was obtained 
from Levy-Yeyati (2006).  And, (b) an index of currency mismatches constructed by 
Eichengreen et al (2005).  This index, however, is not available as a time series.  In the 
results reported below I make the assumption that countries had the same degree of 
mismatch for the 1985-2004 period.  Because of this, the results obtained when the 
Eichegreen and Panizza index was used should be interpreted with extreme care.  
The results obtained are in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6.  As may be seen, the 
coefficients of these dollarization-related variables are not significant at conventional 
levels.  This suggests that, with other things given, the degree of dollarization does not 
affect in an important way a country’s vulnerability to a sudden stop.  It is important to 
notice, however, that this does not mean that dollarization plays no role in crisis episodes.  
Indeed, it is possible that the costs associated with sudden stop crises are higher in 
dollarized nations.  This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.           
   Instrumental  Variables:  It is possible, although in my view unlikely, that the 
analysis presented in the preceding sections is subject to endogeneity.  In particular, 
under certain circumstances capital restrictions (and maybe, even trade restrictions) may 
be increased as a result of the perception that a sudden stop will occur in the future.  In 
order to address this potential endogeneity issue I estimated the probit model using 
                                                 
17  See, for example, Eichengreen et al. (2005).   20
maximum likelihood instrumental variables procedure suggested by Amemiya (1978).
18  
In this estimation I used the two continuous indexes of openness (Tariff and Financial 
Op) used in the estimation of column (6.3) in Table 6.
19 
    In determining the instruments I relied on several findings from the empirical 
literature on capital controls:  (1) Political developments also play an important role in 
determining the extent of capital restrictions.  (2) More advanced countries tend to rely 
less on capital controls.  (3) Distance and geographical location are exogenous 
determinants of trade flows and openness.  Based on these considerations, in the 
instrumental variables estimation the following instruments were used: a measure of civil 
liberties, as a proxy for political instability; an index of ethnic fractionalization; lagged 
change in the terms of trade; the lagged contagion indicator in other regions; lagged 
current account balance; lagged (real) world interest rates; the log of GDP per capita in 
1970; regional dummies; latitude; and an index of predicted trade flows over GDP, 
calculated using a gravity model.
 20  The results obtained from the instrumental variables 
probit estimates are reported in Table 7.  The results obtained generally support the 
findings on the effects of financial openness on the probability of a sudden stop.  The 
covariates have the expected signs and most are significant.   The most important result 
from this paper’s perspective is that the coefficient of financial openness is, as in the 
previously reported estimates, significantly positive; moreover, its point estimate is 
similar to that obtained when no correction for potential endogeneity was made.  On the 
other hand, in the instrumental variables estimation the coefficient of Tariff is not 
significant at conventional levels.   
Future Work:  The analysis presented above has relied on the nonlinear properties of 
probits to investigate the way in which different variables – including the degree of trade 
and financial openness, the exchange rate regime and current account imbalances – 
interact to determine the probability of a country experiencing a sudden and abrupt 
decline in capital inflows.  An alternative way to deal with this issue – and one that is 
                                                 
18  The identifying restriction is that the number of instruments excluded from the main equation is equal or 
greater than the number of endogenous variables.     
19   The estimation of IV probits when the endogenous variables are binary is extremely complex.  For this 
reason in this paper I used the continuous indicators discussed above.  
20   As Aizenman and Noy (2004) have shown, there is a strong empirical connection between trade 
openness and the degree of capital mobility.  The use of gravity trade equations to generate instruments in 
panel estimation has been pioneered by Jeff Frankel.  See, for example, Frankel and Cavallo (2004).   21
beyond the scope of this paper – is to introduce in the estimation terms that interact two 
or more covariates.  This specification would provide information on the cross effect of 
one of the covariates on the probability of a sudden stop.
21 Future work on the subject 
could indeed investigate the nature of these interactive terms and cross effects.  
Additionally, future work should focus on trying to determine whether different forms of 
financial restrictions affect the probability of a crisis in different ways.  As pointed out 
above, a particularly interesting question is whether controls on capital inflows and 
controls on outflows have the same effect on the probability of a crisis. 
  Other promising avenues for future work include devising alternative ways of 
depicting different sequencing scenarios.  The approach taken in this paper provides 
interesting insights, but it is not based on a fully dynamic analysis where different 
sequences can be identified sharply.  Moving in this direction would require constructing 
new openness indexes that would capture the interplay between trade and financial 
openness.  This would be extremely useful, as it would help policy makers understand the 
way in which the interplay between trade and capital account openness affect 
vulnerability.  As pointed out earlier, another area of future research is constructing 
indexes of financial integration that differentiate between controls on outflows and 
inflows for a large number of countries over many years.  
  The results reported above deal with the effects of alternative degrees of openness 
on the probability of a sudden stop crisis.  An important question – and one that 
complements the analysis presented here – has to do with the costs faced by a country 
once a crisis erupts.  In particular, are these costs similar in countries that have followed 
alternative opening strategies? Or, are theses costs different for countries that followed 
different liberalization sequences?  These important questions are beyond the scope of the 
current paper.  
4.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I used panel probit and a large cross country data set to investigate 
whether an increase in the degree of openness – both trade and financial – affects the 
probability of external crises.  I was particularly interested in investigating the way in 
which the interaction between openness in the trade and capital accounts – the so-called 
                                                 
21 See Edwards (2007a) for an application to external crises.   22
sequencing of reform -- affect these probabilities. I also focused on potential roles of 
current account and fiscal imbalances, contagion, international reserves holdings, and the 
exchange rate regime as possible determinants of external crises.  In the analysis I used 
new measures of capital account and trade restrictions developed by the Fraser Institute. 
A main objective of this work is trying to determine whether rapid reforms that open the 
financial account early on increase a country’s degree of vulnerability to crises.  The 
results reported in the preceding pages provide some (preliminary) evidence suggesting 
that “financial liberalization first” strategies increase the degree of vulnerability to crises.  
This is particularly the case if these strategies are pursued with pegged exchange rates 
and if they result in large current account imbalances.   Although these results should be 
interpreted with caution – in particular due to the imperfect nature of the index of capital 
mobility --, they do support the view that “sequencing matters,” a view expressed early 
on by McKinnon (1973) and Edwards (1984), and more recently by Stiglitz (2002).   
Finally, it is important to emphasize that this paper has dealt with only one aspect 
of policies aimed at opening an economy.  Indeed, I have not addressed issues related to 
the effects of financial and/or trade liberalization on total factor productivity growth, 
aggregate growth and/or welfare.  At this time, however, there is a considerable body of 
empirical evidence suggesting that countries that are more open to international trade 
experience faster total factor productivity growth than countries that restrict trade.
22  
Whether this is a long term effect, or one that eventually dies off is still the subject of 
some discussion.  There is also evidence that more open economies are able to adjust 
more rapidly – and less costly – to external shocks.
23   The evidence on the effects of 
financial openness on growth and overall economic performance, however, is not that 
clear cut.  A challenge for future research is to develop a unified empirical framework 
that considers the simultaneous effects of financial and trade openness – and the 
sequencing of reform --, including the effects on growth, welfare and vulnerability to 
crises.           
                                                 
22 Edwards (1998). 
23 Calvo et al (2004), Edwards (2004).      23
Table 1 
Average Import Tariffs and Index of Capital Mobility 
 
 
    Mean Tariff (%)    





Years 1985 1995 2004     
All 
Years 1985 1995 2004 
                  
Industrial  Mean  5.686 7.886 6.639 2.633    6.773  5.542  8.246  7.517 
  St.  Dev. 3.4 2.6 1.3 1.7    2.6  3.0  1.6  1.0 
  Obs.  231.0  22.0  23.0  24.0    240.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 
                  
Latin American and Caribbean  Mean  17.895  34.248  12.695  10.716    4.533  2.360  5.940  5.720 
  St.  Dev  13.5  17.4 3.5  6.1    3.1 2.8  2.9  2.2 
  Obs.  200.0  21.0  21.0  25.0    249.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
                  
Asia    Mean  20.591 33.907 29.423 10.153    2.975  2.500 3.638 3.447 
  St.  Dev.  21.8 31.5 24.3  6.9    2.8  3.4 3.2 2.3 
  Obs.  140.0  14.0  13.0  17.0    162.0 16.0 16.0 17.0 
                  
Africa    Mean  19.470 27.540 24.336 14.932    1.885  0.567 1.468 3.494 
  St.  Dev.  9.5 11.3 7.6  5.9    2.4 1.2  2.3  2.4 
  Obs.  233.0  25.0  25.0  31.0    307.0 30.0 31.0 32.0 
                  
Middle  East    Mean  13.539 15.433 15.300 11.311    3.413  1.500 2.770 5.190 
  St.  Dev. 10.1  13.3 8.3  6.3    3.0 1.6  2.5  2.7 
  Obs.  64.0  9.0  6.0  9.0    100.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
                  
Eastern Europe   Mean  9.359  20.100  10.330  7.372    3.625  0.000  4.950  5.595 
  St.  Dev. 6.7 9.2 6.3 5.1    3.0  0.0  2.3  1.8 
  Obs.  90.0  2.0  10.0  18.0    134.0 10.0 14.0 19.0 
                  
World  Mean  14.628 24.015 16.381  9.668    3.870  2.293 4.517 5.102 
  St.  Dev.  13.3 19.1 12.9  6.8    3.2  3.0 3.4 2.5 
   Obs.  968.0  94.0  98.0  126.0     1209.0  116.0  122.0  129.0 
 
Source:  Fraser Institute   24
Table 2 
Configurations of Trade and Financial Openness and Alternative 






Closed Trade Account 
 
Open Trade Account 
 














Note: See texts for details. 
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Table 3 
Incidence of Sudden Stops, 1970-2004 
 
 
  No Sudden Stop  Sudden Stop 
    
Industrial 94.07  5.93 
Latin American and Caribbean  93.02  6.98 
Asia 94.36  5.64 
Africa 93.91  6.09 
Middle East  85.53  14.47 
Eastern Europe  91.82  8.18 
World 93.24  6.76 
    
Number of observations  1627   
        
    
Pearson:    
Uncorrected chi2(5) 8.6919   
Design-based F(5, 8130) 1.7373   
P - value 0.1224    
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Table 4 
Marginal Effects and Predicted Probabilities of Sudden Stops 
 
 
 (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3) 
      
Financial Openness  0.0382  0.0421  0.0460 
  (2.36) **  (2.21) **  (2.75) *** 
Trade Openness   0.0070  0.0100  0.0199 
 (0.48)  (0.55)  (1.25) 
Contagion 0.0010  0.0009  0.0010 
  (2.01) **  (1.53)  (2.03) ** 
Terms of Trade Change  0.0004  0.0000  -0.0001 
 (1.05)  (0.09)  (0.16) 
World Interest Rate  0.0068  0.0080  0.0051 
  (2.46) **  (2.36) **  (1.94) * 
Flexible -0.0153  -0.0216  -0.0207 
  (1.56)  (1.81) *  (2.06) ** 
Public Sector Deficit  0.0007  0.0026  -- 
 (0.68)  (2.05)  **   
International Reserves (% Total External Liabilities)  0.0004  -0.0001  -- 
 (1.38)  (0.32)   
Current Account Deficit (% of GDP)  0.0065  --  0.0072 
  (5.90) ***   (6.97) *** 
      
Predicted Probability  0.0317  0.0433  0.0384 
      
Number of Observations  1295  1295  1627 
Number of Countries  93  93  113 
 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** 
significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.. Regional dummies included, but not reported. 
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Table 5 
Estimated Probabilities of a Sudden Stops under Alternative 
Configurations of Financial and Trade Openness 






Closed Trade Account 
 
Open Trade Account 
 














Note: In computing these probabilities (most) other covariates were set at their mean 
values.  The computation was done for a typical Latin American country.  See the text for 
details.  
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Table 6 
Marginal Effects and Predicted Probabilities of Sudden Stops: Alternative 
Indicators and Samples 
 
 (6.1)  (6.2)  (6.3)  (6.4)  (6.5)  (6.6) 
            
Current Account Deficit (% of GDP)  0.007  0.0069  0.0073  0.0065  0.0080  0.0058 
 (7.30)***  (4.36)***  (7.27)***  (7.45)***  (5.31)*** (3.33)***
Contagion 0.0011  0.0012  0.0012  0.0011  0.0016  0.0009 
 (2.22)**  (2.31)**  (2.29)**  (2.25)***  (1.96)**  (0.86) 
Terms of Trade Change  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0006 
 (0.72)  (0.79)  (0.38)  (0.92)  (0.70)  (0.52) 
World Interest Rate  0.0045  0.0057  0.0055  0.0050  0.0015  0.0010 
 (1.76)*  (2.18)**  (2.04)**  (1.93)*  (0.27)  (0.13) 
Flexible -0.0188  -0.024  -0.0218  -0.0143  -0.0250  0.0018 
 (1.90)*  (2.36)**  (2.17)**  (1.39)  (1.42)  (0.08) 
Financial Openness  0.0434  --  --  0.0372  0.0405  0.0597 
 (2.76)***      (2.53)**  (1.68)*  (2.03)** 
Trade Openness  0.0188  --  --  --  0.0063  0.0115 
 (1.21)        (0.27)  (0.47) 
Financial Openness (Index w/missing)  --  0.0379  --  --  --  -- 
   (1.95)*         
Trade Openness (Index w/missing)  --  0.021  --  --  --  -- 
   (1.11)         
Financial Openness (Continuous Index)  --  --  0.0067  --  --  -- 
     (2.97)***      
Trade Openness (Continuous Index) --  --  -0.0006  -- -- -- 
     (1.07)       
(export + Imports) / GDP  --  --  --  0.0004  --  -- 
       (3.33)***     
Dollarization --  --  --  --  -0.0140  0.0198 
         (0.29)  (0.36) 
Mismatch --  --  --  --  --  -0.0041 
           (0.35) 
            
Predicted Probability  0.0393  0.0218  0.0395  0.0409  0.0575  0.0595 
Number of Observations  1745  955  1627  1741  797  505 
Number of Countries  113  95  113  113  83  50 
 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** 











Financial Openness (Instrumented)  0.2132 
 (2.84)  *** 
Mean Tariff (Instrumented)  0.0257 
 (1.46)   
Current Account Deficit (% of GDP)  0.0730 
 (6.44)  *** 
Contagion 0.0104 
 (1.92)  * 
World Interest Rate  0.0389 
 (1.35)   
Terms of Trade Change  -0.0011 
 (-0.31)   
Flexible -0.3534 
 (-3.06)  *** 
  
Predicted Probability  0.0384 
  
Number of Observations  1627 
Number of Countries  113 
 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** 
significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. For the list of instruments, see the text. Regional 
dummies included, but not reported. 
 





Variable Description  Source 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  Consumer Price Index  World Development Indicators 
Civil Liberties  Index Civil Liberties  Freedom House 
Contagion  Relative occurrence of capital flow contractions 
in each country’s “reference group.” 
Author’s construction based on data of 
financial account (World Development 
Indicators) 
Contagion  other Regions 
Relative occurrence of capital flow contractions 
in all regions different from each country’s 
“reference group.” 
Author’s construction based on data of 
financial account (World Development 
Indicators) 
Current Account  Current Account  World Development Indicators 
Dollarization  Financial dollarisation, index constructed by   Levy Yeyati (2006) 
Exports  Exports  World Development Indicators 
External Liabilities  External Liabilities  Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) 
Financial Openness 
Variable 4E  "International Capital Market 
Controls". The Dummy takes a value 1 if in any 
given year a financial openness index takes a 
value in excess of 6, in a scale from 1 to 10. The 
continuous index is the actual data for each 
country. Missing data was filled using Stata 
impute procedure. 
Gwartney and Lawson (2007)   
Fiscal Deficit  Fiscal Deficit  World Development Indicators 
Flexible 
Dummy with value 1 if exchange rate regime is 
flexible and 0 otherwise. Classification based in 
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger de facto 
exchange rate regimes classification. 
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) 
GDP per capita in 1970  GDP per capita in 1970  World Development Indicators 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  World Development Indicators 
Imports  Imports  World Development Indicators 
Inflation  Annual change in CPI  Author’s construction. 
International Reserves  International Reserves  Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) 
Mean Tariff (Openness Index) 
Variable 4 Aii  "Mean tariff rate" (the data, not 
the index). The Dummy takes a value 1 if the 
average tariff in that year and country is equal 
or lower than 10%. The continuous index is the 
actual data for each country. Missing data was 
filled using Stata impute procedure. 
Gwartney and Lawson (2007)   
Measure of Trade Openness  Fitted value from a gravity model of bilateral 
trade  Author’s construction. 
Mistmatch  Currency mismatches constructed by 
Eichengreen et al (2005)  Eichengreen et al (2005) 
Net Capital Inflow  Net Capital Inflow  World Development Indicators 
No tariff Trade Barriers  Variable 4Bi  "No tariff trade barriers"  "The Economic Freedom of the World 
Project", The Fraser Institute  
Sudden Stop 
Reduction of net capital inflows of at least 5% 
of GDP in one year. The country in question 
must have received an inflow of capital larger to 
its region’s third quartile during the previous 
two years prior to the “sudden stop.” 
Author’s construction based on data of 
financial account (World Development 
Indicators)   31
Terms of Trade  Trade-exports as capacity to import (constant 
local currency units)  World Development Indicators 
World Interest Rate  Real U.S. 10 year Treasuries (Nominal interest 
rate minus corresponding inflation)  Author’s construction. 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Probability that two randomly selected people 
in a country will not belong to the same ethnic 
group. 
Weil (2005) 
Latitude Latitude  Weil  (2005) 
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